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Introduction
A large body of economic research focuses on the determinants of household savings. One important concern in this literature is whether many households are saving adequately. For instance, in a survey administered by Choi et al. (2004) two-thirds of respondents view their current savings rate as being "too low." In the short-term, inadequate savings renders households vulnerable to negative income shocks (e.g. unforeseen health expenses). In the long-run, households may not be able to achieve a desired standard of living in retirement. At the macro level, a low national savings rate translates into lower levels of investment and thus lower rates of economic growth.
This project will use a set of speci…cally designed experimental interventions in conjunction with survey data collection to examine some of the leading explanations for household saving behavior. In particular, it will examine the relevance of self-control related problems in explaining observed saving behavior. The project will develop formal tests for the presence of self-control problems (such as impatience) by o¤ering respondents monetary prizes for achieving saving goals. The main intervention o¤ers respondents one of two types of …nancial rewards, immediate or delayed, if they save or commit to saving their income tax refund for a speci…c length of time. This will be combined with a second intervention, a soft-commitment device that o¤ers households a …nancial reward if their actual saving decision at the time they receive a refund corresponds to their stated decision three months earlier. Together these interventions will allow the researcher to identify the parameters of a quasi-hyperbolic discounting model (which nests the standard model of time-consistent preferences).
Using the interventions and survey data the project can convincingly answer two key questions using …eld experimental evidence and shed light on a third, related policy question:
1. To what extent does impatience play a role in saving behavior for low-income households?
2. Can a better understanding of impatience help improve the design of policies aimed at encouraging savings among low-income households?
3. Do the policies under consideration, which encourage savings among low-income households at tax time, appear to be "nudging" agents in an optimal direction?
The answers to these questions have broad implications for understanding how U.S. households maintain bu¤er stock savings in the short term and save for old age. The answers will also inform the design of policies aimed at increasing their welfare, especially in the case of the lower-income households that will be a focus of the study.
Concretely, the results will shed light on the design of …nancial tools that help lower income households smooth consumption over lumpy annual payments, such as the annual receipt of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), and to reach desired savings goals.
Below we outline the design of a forthcoming …eld experiment. We also provide results from the pilot version of this study. Our preferred point estimates for and over an 8-month horizon from a quasi-hyperbolic discounting model are 0.34 and 1.08 respectively. These translate into a one-year discount factor of 0.38, or equivalently, a one-year discount rate of 164%. Our results are limited by the sample size and other idiosyncratic factors associated with the pilot study and are therefore only suggestive. Our aim is to replicate the pilot study with larger sample size, generating more precise estimates.
Related Literature and Ongoing Work
Previous research has demonstrated that among tax …lers there exists a demand for savings options (Beverly et al. (2006) ), a positive e¤ect of a match on savings (Du ‡o et al. (2006) ) and a demand for illiquid savings options, such as a savings bond (Tufano (2008) ). The PIs plan to expand on these studies by applying lessons from a second set of studies that demonstrate a positive e¤ect of pre-commitment on savings. Commitment devices have been studied in the context of de…ned contribution retirement accounts (Bernatzi and Thaler (2004) ), among consumers in the Philippines (Ashraf et al. (2006) ) and for health interventions (Tarozzi et al. (2009) , Mahajan and Tarozzi (2010) ).
The project's contribution includes examining the e¤ects of commitment mechanisms in the context of income tax refund-based saving in the US. Furthermore, the experiment is designed to test theories of self-control and savings found in models of quasi-hyperbolic discounting (Laibson (1997) , O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999) ). Though their exists laboratory evidence in support of these models, ours will be one of very few …eld-experimental studies that yields direct empirical tests of these models. In particular, we seek quantitative estimates of and , which compliment previous …eld studies that focus on qualitative evidence of time-inconsistency.
In ongoing work, Gine et al. (2010) implement a …eld experiment in which quantitative measures of time preference and time-inconsistency are correlated with the likelihood of revising one's savings plans. Whereas their study applies to rural households in a developing economy, Malawi, our study focuses on low-income households in an urban setting in the US. Meier and Sprenger (2010) elicit time-preference parameters from similar sample as ours: low-income tax …lers in the US. These parameters are then correlated with credit scores and debt levels. In these studies timepreferences are elicited by incentivized choice experiments: either the "convex time budget" or "multiple price list" method.
1 They may be regarded as "artefactual …eld experiments" in the parlance of Harrison and List (2004) . Our study contributes to this line of work by measuring time-preferences in the course of decisions that are routine to the agents, i.e. the decision to save one's income tax refund. Thus, we aim for a context that is akin to a "natural …eld experiment" (Harrison and List (2004) ).
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The current project builds upon previous work by the PIs that explore the e¤ects of commitment mechanisms on compliance with health-protecting behavior (Tarozzi et al. (2009) ) and current work that develops econometric tools to identify the parameters of a quasi-hyperbolic discounting model in this context (Mahajan and Tarozzi (2010) ).
Furthermore, it directly relates to current work by the PIs which shows that default EITC rules generate lumpy pay schedules (Jones (Forthcoming) ) and that this phenomenon may have implications for recipients'savings, borrowing and consumption smoothing (Jones (2010a) ). The current project is at the nexus of these previous studies and is a natural extension of this work. Finally, while the full-scale implementation of this project will take place between 2011 and 2012, its design is informed by a smaller scale pilot study that the PIs have implemented between late 2010 and early 2011.
Study Design
This section will outline the study design which is then analyzed formally in Section 4 and implemented in a pilot study in Section 5. To …x ideas, consider an individual who …les her taxes in February and chooses between receiving her income tax refund immediately or placing it in an illiquid savings account until October. Suppose further that the individual is o¤ered a savings match as an incentive. Finally, suppose her match is increased by a small amount, and this additional incentive can either be received immediately (February) or is delayed until money is withdrawn from the savings account (October). Conversations with tax planners suggest that such individuals focus heavily on the prospect of receiving the refund as soon as possible and pay far less attention to the need to put some of the refund aside for future events or the opportunity to earn a match on these savings, which suggests they may have present-biased preferences. As compared to the baseline take-up rate of this account, the relative e¤ect of the additional incentives, immediate or delayed, can give one a sense of the time discount between the two periods. 3 Alternatively, suppose that the individual were asked at some earlier date (e.g. in December) to choose between receiving the refund in February or saving it until some future date (e.g. October) and thereby earning the match on the savings. Again, suppose that the incentive to save is increased by an amount, either delivered early in February or late in October. Standard theories of present-biased preferences predict that when asked at an earlier date, the respondent may be more inclined to choose the savings option. In addition, from this pre-tax season vantage point, the relative e¤ect of the early and late incentives will be less pronounced. Intuitively, when making a decision in December, the tax …ler already has to wait two months to receive the refund. Waiting an additional couple of months to receive a larger refund may not seem so bad. The individual is more aware of the bene…ts of saving vis-a-vis the cost of putting the money aside when both occur far enough in the future. The model also suggests that if the tax …ler can make a binding, early decision in December to save in February, she may do so as a means of self-control. However, if the commitment device not completely binding, a sophisticated tax …ler may avoid it, realistically believing that commitment will ultimately be undone. The use of a partial commitment mechanism will be key in allowing the researcher to infer preferences in December over outcomes in February and October.
The experimental design follows the outline sketched above. First, using information from the prior year's tax return, participants will be randomized into two treatment groups (the "commitment" and the "non-commitment" group). Within each group, clients will be further randomized into three sub-groups based on the timing of a monetary incentive (either baseline, early/immediate incentives or late/delayed incentives). 4 In the December preceding the tax season, the PIs will elicit a soft-commitment savings decision from members of the commitment treatment groups. After individuals have made a choice, they will be reminded of their prior decision when the actual tax season arrives and will receive a monetary reward if they honor their prior commitment. 5 Members of the non-commitment group will not be o¤ered the soft-commitment device. However, at the tax site, members of both treatment groups will have the option of saving their income tax refund, and will receive a match provided that the savings remains in an account for a designated period of time. Finally, there are additional incentives to pre-commit or save, which are early/immediate or late/delayed, i.e. delivered in February or October, respectively. The study results in six di¤erent groups of participants: those with commitment and non-commitment, and within each of those two groups, those with an early/immediate incentive, those with a late/delayed incentive and a set of baseline group members.
A theoretical model below will show how the di¤erent groups help in identifying key parameters in the model.
Sample
The project will proceed in two phases. In the …rst currently on-going phase the PIs are running a pilot study to help guide the …nal research design, which will be implemented in 2011-2012. For the pilot the sampling frame is a pool of previous clients from a Volunteer Income Tax Association (VITA) organization 6 -The Financial Clinic in New York City. We have chosen to sample from clients with tax refunds greater than $300. 7 In our pilot study, we reached out to 833 clients, who were randomly assigned to one of six treatment groups. Given the results of our pilot, we estimate a sample size of 1,238 for our full-scale study. We will likewise draw this sample from prior clients 3 The use of monetary incentives to identify discount factors in part relies on an assumption of borrowing constraints. This is perhaps reasonable for the low-income EITC recipients in our study and can additionally be con…rmed using survey data among participants. 4 To emphasize the di¤erences between treatment arms, we deem the February incentive the "early" incentive and the October incentive the "late" incentive when referring to the commitment group. However, within the non-commitment group, we use the terms "immediate" and "delayed" to describe the timing of incentives.
5 This allows us to distinguish the soft-commitment from "cheap talk." 6 Third-party tax preparation is quite common among low-income households, particularly those eligible for various refundable credits (which are the object of many saving promotion policies). For instance, IRS public use data suggests that 70% of EITC recipients in 2006 used a tax preparer 7 Analysis of 2008 and 2009 tax data at this tax preparer indicated that past refunds are highly predictive of future refunds. Note that over 80% of US tax …lers receive income-tax refunds with the share being even higher for low-income households (IRS public use data). In our pilot, the average refund size was about $2,095 for Tax Year (TY) 2009. and walk-ins at the tax site. 8 The population we are sampling from, while not representative of the US population, is of direct interest to policy makers. There are various state sponsored initiatives aimed at encouraging low-income tax …lers to save 9 and our intervention is well suited to examine issues surrounding the take-up of at least one of these programs. In addition,
we are not concerned that our estimates are biased due to the refund restrictions we have made. In particular, recent research by the PI (Jones (Forthcoming)) demonstrates that the income tax refund is the result of largely passive behavior on behalf of the tax …ler, especially in the case of low-income tax …lers that receive the EITC. 
Experimental Arms
We will assign each client to one of six potential groups. In particular, the client will belong to either the commitment or non-commitment treatment, and within each treatment to either the early/immediate match, the late/delayed match or the baseline group.
1. Tax …lers in the non-commitment group will be contacted in the December preceding the tax season. 11 They will be invited to participate in the …rst wave of a longitudinal survey.
(a) The participant will also be noti…ed of a savings opportunity: the SaveUp Account. When they return to …le their taxes, they will be o¤ered the incentive of a savings match. In order to keep the match, the tax …ler must keep her savings amount in an illiquid account for 8 months. In return for saving an amount of $300 or greater, the tax …ler will receive a 50% match for each dollar saved between $300 and $1,050.
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This is the baseline group (Treatment Group 6). In addition, there will be two additional sub-groups who are o¤ered either an "immediate" incentive of $50 (Treatment Group 4), given at the time of …ling taxes, or a "delayed" incentive of $50 received after the 8 month saving period (Treatment Group 5), in return for saving. 13 A treatment member of the non-commitment group has the opportunity to receive up to $425 in savings incentives. A baseline member of the non-commitment group can receive up to $375 in savings incentives.
(b) Survey data will be collected during the baseline interview, at the time of tax …ling and 8 months after taxes are …led. The survey will measure outcomes that include level of savings, expenditures, income and 8 Please refer to http://home.uchicago.edu/~j1s/Jones_Mahajan_Appendix_NSF.pdf for a detailed power calculation. One possible concern is that the total amount of monetary transfers, and by extension our total budget, depends on actual take-up and is therefore not certain ex ante. Fortunately, we can monitor take-up and therefore the maximum possible transfers in real time. To the extent that we experience higher than expected take-up, we can remain within our budget by scaling back the sample size. Moreover, our power calculations make clear that our required sample size is inversely related to the treatment e¤ect. Thus, this reduction in sample size in response to underestimated treatment e¤ects does not necessarily come at the expense of statistical power.
9 Examples of this include: numerous changes to the tax …ling process including the ability to have refunds deposited directly into savings accounts or invested in savings bonds, a national pilot to o¤er matched savings to low-income …lers (Save USA) and potentially the Savers Credit, though this last program targets a broader range of incomes.
1 0 In an appendix of that paper, the author shows that the high level of overwithholding cannot be fully explained by a preference for forced savings. Other work by the PI (Jones (2010b) ) suggests that it's safe to assume that the Advance EITC and its low take-up can be safely ignored due to dramatically low awareness this program.
1 1 For the pilot, we are also enrolling a set of non-commitment clients directly in February at tax-preparation time. Comparing outcomes for this group with outcomes for the non-commitment group members contacted in December should help us explore an alternative, low cost means of sample recruitment (we thank a previous reviewer for this suggestion).
1 2 The match is generous, but in fact less generous than pre-existing programs o¤ered by e.g. New York state. The Save NYC account o¤ers a 50% match on every dollar, until $1,000 (see http://www.nyc.gov/html/ofe/html/poverty/save.shtml). Furthermore, this program is currently being piloted in several cities, demonstrating scalability. To date, however, take-up results have been quite disappointing -less than 5%. Our contribution would be to (1) identify plausible causes for extremely low take-up for apparently very generous accounts and (2) identify, conditional on o¤ering such an attractive incentive, ways of encouraging savings at lower costs. That is, can one generate an equal amount of savings with a lower match by exploiting time-inconsistency? Importantly, the Save NYC account is not simultaneously o¤ered to our study participants. 1 3 Even though the "immediate" match is given up front, it is forfeited by deducting the match amount from the savings account in the event of an early withdrawal. measures of credit constraints, income volatility and relevant demographic information. 14 2. Tax …lers in the commitment group will be contacted in the December preceding the tax season and invited to participate in a longitudinal survey as well. In addition, they will be o¤ered the soft-commitment option, which will be presented as follows:
(a) In December, the individual will be asked to make a soft-commitment regarding a savings account: the SaveUpFront Account. They have the option of pre-committing to save or pre-committing to not save.
The savings account is similar to before, with a minimum deposit of $300, and a 50% match on every additional dollar deposited up until $950. 15 The commitment is "soft" in that the ultimate savings decision can deviate from the commitment. However, the pre-commitment still matters for future incentives. If the tax …ler pre-commits, the savings account will include an additional $100 in savings matches for saving at least $300. Alternatively, if the tax …ler pre-commits to not saving, she still has the option to save at the tax site, but now will receive a $75 payment in October should she not save. Thus, the commitment reinforces decisions in either direction, and therefore can be distinguished from "cheap talk." 16 This is the baseline commitment group (Treatment Group 3).
(b) Some commitment group members will additionally be o¤ered an incentive for pre-committing to save.
For pre-committing to save, the individual will receive a $50 incentive. This incentive will either be an "early" incentive, given at the time of …ling taxes (Treatment Group 1), or a "late" one received 8 months Due to space limitations, we have not included visual depictions of the incentives. However, extensive-form representations of the incentives for each of the six groups are available in the appendix. 19 We strongly encourage the reader to view these visuals to gain a better understanding of the incentives.
Time Line
December 2010 Both commitment and non-commitment group members in the pilot study have been contacted and noti…ed of the 1 4 Measuring savings and debt overtime will allow us see how realistic an assumption of credit constraints is. We can also see if savings or debt are endogenously changed between December and tax season in response to anticipation of the savings incentive.
1 5 We choose di¤erent upper limits for the two groups since commitment group members receive additional incentives for following through with commitments. In particular, this allows our scripts across treatments to be roughly equivalent when we state, you will have the opportunity to receive as much as "$X" in savings incentives. Furthermore, we see that the upper limit is typically not binding in our pilot study.
1 6 The pre-commitment decision is symmetric in the sense that individuals can commit to either saving or not saving. This is because the pre-commitment decision is based both on one's preferred outcome in February and what they believe to be the most likely outcome. For individuals with time-inconsistent preferences, the two may not be the same. In particular, there may be very low-probability savers for whom committing not to save is optimal.
1 7 As will be explained below, making this incentive independent of the …nal savings decision is key for separately identifying the discount parameters in a quasi-hyperbolic discounting model. 1 8 We should reiterate that take-up of these accounts is relatively low, so that realized payments will tend to be far below maximum potential payments. 1 9 http://home.uchicago.edu/~j1s/Jones_Mahajan_Appendix_NSF.pdf savings incentives. Additionally, commitment group members are o¤ered the soft-commitment.
February 2011-april 2011
Participants in the pilot study make an actual decision regarding the savings option while …ling their tax return.
Commitment group members are additionally reminded of their prior, soft-commitment. Surveys are conducted among pilot study participants to help inform the …nal design of the study. In addition, participants are recruited for participation in the next round of the study.
October -December 2011
Both commitment and non-commitment group members in the full-scale study are contacted and noti…ed of the savings incentives. Additionally, commitment group members are o¤ered the soft-commitment. Savings matches from the pilot study are deposited into accounts.
February 2012-April 2012
Participants in the full-scale study make a …nal decision regarding the savings option while …ling their tax return.
Commitment group members are additionally reminded of their prior, soft-commitment. Surveys of all participants are also administered in order to provide additional, qualitative data.
October -December 2012
Savings matches from the full-scale study are deposited into accounts.
Discussion
As described above, the contributions of the project are both an empirical test of economic theory and the evaluation of …nancial policy tools used among low-income tax …lers. First, we join a relatively recent literature that uses …eld experiments to test theories of time-inconsistency. We add to this literature by obtaining additional quantitative estimates of the parameters of a quasi-hyperbolic discounting model and elicit these preferences from choices that take place in a "natural" decision setting. Our study also takes place in a policy-relevant setting. Policies and research surrounding the …nancial decisions made upon receiving one's income tax refund have developed into a virtual cottage industry. In this …eld, comprised of practitioners and researchers, it is commonly thought a prudent idea to save some or all of the income tax refund, hence the prevalence of savings incentive programs. In our study, we remain agnostic as to whether the savings is the optimal decision, but nonetheless aim to contribute to this policy question.
First, our perturbation of existing savings incentives allows us to compare alternative methods of encouraging savings. In particular, our pilot study below suggests that varying the timing of savings incentives can result in a more cost-e¤ective program design. A larger question is whether this savings results in a welfare improvement, at the very least for the participants. On the one hand, income tax refunds are comprised of overwithholdings and lagged transfers, which suggests that they are prime candidates for spending or debt reduction. On the other hand, these lumpy payments may provide a bu¤er of savings moving forward that is otherwise hard to build up in the presence of self-control problems. Even so, placing the bu¤er in an illiquid account limits the insurance possibilities.
However, research shows that even at the monthly frequency, lumpy bene…ts appear to be drawn down too quickly.
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Thus, it remains an empirical question whether placing a portion of the refund in an illiquid account can aid in a more even, intra-annual allocation of the income tax refund and help provide a bu¤er against late-year shocks by stemming the draw-down of the income tax refund earlier in the year. 21 With our experimental variation in savings account use and our longitudinal survey, we can speak to this policy-relevant question by estimating the causal e¤ect of the illiquid savings account on consumption smoothing.
Model
This section outlines a basic version of the model that informs the experimental design and empirical methodology.
We model the savings account as an "investment good" as in DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004) (see also DellaVigna and Malmendier (2002) and DellaVigna (2009) or "immediate cost" activities in O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999)).
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We begin by specifying preferences and beliefs and then by outlining for each period the state space, action space and per-period payo¤s. 23 Before moving forward, it will be useful to summarize the key features of the model:
1. Our identi…cation of time preferences is driven by variation in savings incentives at di¤erent points in time. In particular, we measure the e¤ect of an "immediate" incentive relative to that of a "delayed" incentive and then measure the e¤ect of a two future incentives, an "early" and "late" incentive. Under the null hypothesis, these comparisons should yield similar results, while time-inconsistency implies a discrepancy between the two. is not equivalent to time-inconsistency in our model. Rather, it is the marginal e¤ect of savings incentives relative to these baseline probabilities that is used as described below.
4. Our test of time-consistency is not based on the direct e¤ect of the "soft-commitment" on savings probabilities.
Nonetheless, we can measure this e¤ect in the event that it informs the e¤ective design of savings incentives.
Preferences and Beliefs
Individuals maximize utility functions, separable in time, with potentially quasi-hyperbolic discounting, i.e. " " preferences (see Strotz (1955) , Phelps and Pollak (1985) , Laibson (1997) and O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999)). That is, in period t, the present discounted value of a consumption stream is
2 2 In mapping the model to the actual …eld experiment, the discrete choice modeled here is the decision to save at least the minimum amount listed above. Individuals have an additional continuous choice of the amount to save beyond the minimum savings threshold. But note, the immediate and delayed incentives are conditional on the extensive margin decision, and thus map into a discrete choice model. We discuss below how to potentially use the additional continuous choice to estimate time-preferences as in Andreoni and Sprenger (2010) . 2 3 In an appendix, we extend this model to one of dynamic discrete choice with potentially time-inconsistent agents (see Fang and Wang (2008) and Mahajan and Tarozzi (2010) for models along similar lines).
2 4 Though we do not make explicit use of revision behavior, this does not mean that it is uninformative regarding time consistency. We can observe revision behavior based on participant decisions and/or early withdrawal of savings. In addition, we allow for shocks to information regarding the refund level. We can explore the importance of this uncertainty by collecting expectations regarding the refund level in our survey prior to the tax season.
where < 1 generates time-inconsistent preferences. In addition, the agent holds beliefs about future objective functions, parameterized by^ . That is, in period t, the agent believes that the following objective function will be maximized in k periods:
where^ < is referred to as partial naïveté (see O'Donoghue and Rabin (2001)). Our null hypothesis is that individuals are exponential discounters: =^ = 1. Note that, in period t, an individual who is time-inconsistent discounts utility between period t + k and t + k + j by a factor of j , but believes that when period t + k arrives, utility will be discounted by a factor of^ j . When period t + k actually arrives, utility is discounted by j .
State Spaces, Action Spaces and Payo¤s
Period 1 State Space: x 1 2 X 1 where x 1 are pre-intervention observables that potentially a¤ect the agent's utility in period 1.
Action Space: a 1 2 f0; 1g 25 where a 1 = 1 indicates that the agent chooses in period 1 to the "pre-commitment" decision to save in period 2. a 1 = 0 if the agent chooses the "pre-commitment"decision to not save in period 2. For simplicity in exposition the model does not consider an alternative third action in which the agent rejects the …rst two actions.
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Utility Flow in Period 1: To focus only on essential details it is assumed that the individual receives no direct utility ‡ow from actions taken in period 1. All incentives will be derived from the e¤ect on utility ‡ows in periods 2 and 3 as a result of actions taken in period 1.
Period 2
State Space: x 2 2 X 2 f0; 1g where x 2 = a 1 just records the …rst period decision. It is straightforward to incorporate additional state variables using standard approaches but those are eliminated here in the interest of brevity. Note that members of the non-commitment option group do not have an opportunity to make a period 1 decision and therefore, the state variable is irrelevant for their period 2 decision.
Action Space: a 2 2 f0; 1g where a 2 = 1 indicates that the agent chooses to save and a 2 = 0 if the agent decides not to save.
Utility Flow in Period 2: Payo¤s in the second period vary by treatment group. In the non-commitment group (NC) agents receive a payment of i if they decide to save, representing the "immediate" savings incentive. This is the additional $50 incentive for saving, which is contrasted with an equivalent "delayed" incentive received in period 3. In the commitment group (C), if the agent had chosen to pre-commit to saving a 1 = 1 she receives a payo¤ e (irrespective of her actual savings decision). This is referred to as the "early" incentive for pre-committing, which contrasts with the "late" incentive in period 3. In addition, agents in both groups are assumed to pay a cost c (i.e. the cost of saving c dollars, including a binding borrowing constraint) if they decide to save.
The experimental design yields the following values for the u(x 2 ; a 2 ) for the di¤erent treatment groups. Utility is denoted as a function f of the payo¤s since in future work the model will be expanded to explore what can be learned about f ( ) experimentally. However, for this proposal the model will deal mostly with the case where f is 2 5 Note that in the model, we only model actions related to the project choices. In principle, agents could make other decisions (e.g. change their saving and/or consumption behavior) in response to this news. If, for instance, individuals can easily borrow, then they can take other actions that would render the …ndings from our study uninteresting. However, we assume here that individuals face credit constraints (and we attempt to quantify them via the survey). If individuals are credit constrained, then the savings decision at tax-time is an inter-temporal utility trade-o¤ rather than a mere arbitrage opportunity. Individuals can still re-optimize, however, by delaying debt-repayment. We hope to capture this via our survey instruments.
2 6 It can be shown that this third action is weakly dominated.
the identity function, i.e. utility is quasi-linear. This is a strong assumption and discussion of relaxing it can be found below. 27 Payo¤s for period 2 are given by 
Note in the …rst column that u N C (x 2 ; a 2 ) is invariant to the state variable, since there is no pre-commitment for the non-commitment group. Looking at the …rst row of the last column, one can see for example that when a pre-commitment is made, i.e. x 2 = 1, the early savings incentive e is received. Furthermore, a cost c of saving is incurred for all agents that save in either group, i.e. when a 2 = 1. For each group, a normalization of utility in all states with respect to a reference action is needed. In particular, one can normalize u(x 2 ; 0) for all x 2 2 f0; 1g.
For the non-commitment group, this normalization is u(x 2 ; 0) 0. For the commitment group, the normalization assumes f (e) is known.
Period 3
State Space: x 3 2 X 3 f0; 1g f0; 1g where x 3 = (x 2 ; a 2 ). Agents take no action in this period and payo¤s are a function of group status and state variables. In the noncommitment group, if the agent had not saved in period 2, then she receives a payo¤ of 0. If she has saved, she receives a savings incentive of d. This payo¤ d is referred to as the "delayed" payo¤. In the commitment group, the agent receives a payo¤ of p if the pre-commitment and actual savings decision coincide, i.e. x 2 = a 2 . That is, if she had pre-committed to not saving and ful…lled that commitment in period 2 or if the agent had pre-committed to saving in period 1 and she followed through with that commitment, she again receives the a payo¤ p. Finally, for members of the commitment group, a payo¤ l is received irrespective of her period 2 saving decision. This is the "late" incentive for pre-committing to save. Finally, agents in either group who chose to save in period 2 receive a payo¤ of b, which is in e¤ect the value of the amount now available to be withdrawn from the savings account. 
State Transitions: State transitions dF(x t+1 jx t ; a t ) are extremely simple in this basic framework since they are completely deterministic functions of previous period actions.
Discussion: Looking at Tables 1 and 2 one can get a general sense of the source of identi…cation. First, looking at the columns for u N C ( ) one will notice that the incentives (i; d) vary depending on the decision in Period 2, a 2 ( x 3 ) and are by construction invariant to the state variable x 2 ( a 1 ) since members of the N C group do not make pre-commitments. Thus, by observing the response of a 2 to experimental variation in (i; d), one learns about Period 2 preferences over utility in Period 2 (i) relative to utility in Period 3 (d). In contrast, one can see in the columns for u C ( ), (e; l) vary depending on the decision in Period 1, a 1 ( x 2 ), but are invariant to Period 2 decisions, a 2 ( x 3 ). Thus, by observing the response of a 1 to experimental variation in (e; l) one learns about Period 1 preferences over utility in Period 2 (e) relative to utility in Period 3 (l). Finally, the comparison of the preferences in Period 1
and Period 2 provide the grounds for testing for time consistency. Note also that in Table 2 the commitment reward p depends on both the Period 1 decision and the Period 2 decision. All things equal, pre-committing to save makes saving more likely to occur, and vice versa. In this sense, it is the mechanism by which Period 1 decisions can alter Period 2 decisions, and is necessary for making Period 1 decisions nontrivial (without p l all commitment group agents would choose a 1 = 1). 
Solving the Model
To solve the model, we make the following econometric assumptions. Agents are indexed by the variable n. To capture uncertainty over time, we assume that individuals do not know in period 1 the precise values of the cost and bene…ts of savings (c; b), but rather they know the joint distribution of these parameters with c.d.f. G n (c; b). We model the savings the decision as the consumption of an investment good, as in DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004) .
In our particular case, you can imagine that individuals do not know exactly what their income tax refund will be, which generates uncertainty over c and b. 30 The subscript n allows for ex-ante cross-sectional heterogeneity in preferences. Because c and b will be unobservable to the researcher, we will make use of the average c.d.f. of savings
In period 2, c and b are revealed to the agent, but are still unobservable to the researcher. We will also make a structural assumption that the utility function f is the identity function, i.e.
preferences are quasi-linear. Using these assumptions, we solve the model by backward induction. Since no actions are made in period 3, we begin with period 2.
Period 2 Table 3 : Net value of saving in Period 2 by Treatment Group
The net value of saving for agents in commitment and non-commitment groups are shown in Table 3 . Under the assumption that f (x) = x, we see that the agent in the non-commitment group will save (a 2 = 1) if:
For individuals in the commitment group, the decision depends on the whether or not one has pre-committed to save (i.e. x 2 a 1 = 1). The agent's decision can be summarized as follows:
1 if a 1 = 1 and c + b p
Period 1 Only members of the commitment group make decisions in period 1. The expected value of pre-committing to save is
where we have again used the fact that f (x) = x. The …rst component is the payo¤ in the event that the agent actually follows through with the saving pre-commitment and the second component is the payo¤ should the agent fail to follow through. Note that the argument inside the integral includes a discount factor of , as it re ‡ects the agent's preferences in period 1 over payo¤s in period 2 and 3. However, the limits of integration feature a discount factor of^ , as the likelihood of following through with the commitment is based on the period 1 agent's beliefs about period 2 preferences over payo¤s in period 2 and 3. It is this sense in which agents take into account the implications of their pre-commitment decisions on future outcomes. Similarly, the expected value of pre-committing to not save is
The agent will pre-commit to saving if V a1=1 V a1=0 .
Estimation
We now outline our estimation strategy for and . First, using variation in (i; d), we estimate from noncommitment group members in period 2. Note from (3) that
Next, using variation in (e; l), we estimate . Using (5) and (6) we see that:
Thus, we use four reduced form parameters to estimate time preferences. In particular, we estimate the following linear probability model among the commitment group members:
and a similar model is estimated among non-commitment group members:
Here T j are treatment group indicators and the b m measure the early, late, immediate and delayed incentive e¤ects.
The omitted group in (7) is Treatment Group 3 while the omitted group in (8) is Treatment Group 6.
Pilot Study Results
Below we present preliminary results from our pilot version of the …eld experiment. The results will be restricted to estimation of time preference parameters. Evaluation of the savings incentive program and its e¤ect on consumption smoothing are omitted, as necessary survey data are currently in the process of being collected.
Data
We use a combination of administrative and survey data to test for and measure the degree of time-inconsistency in the sample. We have access to administrative tax return data from IRS Form 1040. This includes …ling status, age, adjusted gross income (AGI), unemployment insurance, number of dependents, earned income tax credit (EITC), child tax credit, withholdings, tax liability, federal and state income tax refund, and whether or not direct deposit was used to receive a refund. We have this data for both tax year ( During our initial phone interviews, which happen in the winter prior to the current tax …ling season, we collect data on savings level and debt levels. Following Lusardi et al. (2011) , we measure credit constraints by asking participants the likelihood of unexpectedly owing $2,000, the ability to come up with this amount of cash and the potential source of this cash. In the spirit of Ashraf et al. (2006) , we ask a series of questions aimed at detecting time-inconsistency. Finally, after explaining the SaveUp account to participants, we quiz them on the parameters of the savings vehicle, to measure comprehension. During the initial phone survey, the pre-commitment decision is also recorded. In our follow up survey, which takes place during the current tax …ling season we repeat questions regarding savings, debt, credit constraints and comprehension. The savings decision and savings amount is also recorded on site. and the share married is only 11 percent. The average federal refund is $2,500 and state refund is $666, which is well above the maximum allowable SaveUp deposit. About one-half of the sample has a high school equivalent degree, but only 4 percent have a college degree or higher. Nearly half of the sample is African-American and another 30 percent are Hispanic and only 5 percent are white. The low share of Asian …lers, less than 3 percent, is in part due to the sample being restricted to English and Spanish speaking tax …lers. Finally, three-fourths of the sample reports some type of bank account.
Baseline Descriptive Statistics

Sample Selection and Attrition
One challenge to conducting the pilot study is a high rate of sample attrition. Table 5 shows the likelihood of making to each key stage of the study. The baseline group was selected from the pool of prior year tax clients at the collaborating non-pro…t. We restricted the study to tax …lers who had a 2009 federal income tax refund above $300
and who spoke either English or Spanish. This resulted in an initial pool of 833 potential study participants. The …rst key stage is the pre-tax season phone call during which consent was obtained and pre-commitment decisions were recorded. As can be seen, the majority of attrition is due to the inability to reach participants by phone. Less than one-third is reached by phone. Once on the phone, an additional 13 percent are lost due to failure to obtain consent for the study. Finally, another 6 percent are loss between the pre-tax-…ling season phone call and appearance at the tax site, where …nal savings decisions are made.
We suspect that the primary reason for attrition is that we are attempting to reach low-income households.
In addition, the contact information we had for these households was collected in the prior tax season and may have a high likelihood of changing among this group. Furthermore, our pilot was originally designed to contact all households within a two-week period. In fact, we extended outreach to about one month and could have used more time to reach participants. Note that attrition is not as dramatic if you de…ne the baseline sample as the group successfully reached by phone. From this perspective, the consent rate rises from 15 percent to 51 percent and the share that appears at the tax site rises from 9 percent to 28 percent. In the results below we report intent-to-treat (ITT) e¤ects using the entire sample as well as treatment e¤ects conditional on surviving to each stage of the study.
Though attrition itself is of concern, an even larger issue is di¤erential attrition across treatment groups. Table 5 compares attrition between groups. The …rst thing to note is that the non-commitment groups, Groups 4, 5 and 5, have a signi…cantly lower probability of being reached by phone and consenting by phone. Recall that prior to being called, participants received treatment speci…c informational mailings. It is possible that di¤erential attrition arises because commitment groups can on average receive larger …nancial incentives than non-commitment groups. The second thing to note is that within commitment treatment arms, attrition does not signi…cantly di¤er by treatment group. That is, Groups 1, 2 and 3 do not di¤er from each other, and Groups 4, 5 and 6 do not di¤er from each other.
This is important for our estimates below. For a majority of the analysis below, we will be conducting comparisons within commitment treatment arm. We address nonrandom attrition below. Note: Sample survival rates are the probability of remaining in the study at each stage of the experiment. Two sets of p-values are reported. The "between" p-value measures compares each treatment group to Treatment Group 1, while the "within" p-value compares either Treatment Groups 1 and 2 to Treatment Group 3 or Treatment Groups 4 and 5 to Treatment Group 6. One, two and three stars denote statistically signi…cant di¤erences at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively. Horowitz and Manksi (2000) . One, two and three stars denote statistical signi…cance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively.
Intent to Treat E¤ects
Recall from our theoretical model that we would like to estimate 4 treatment e¤ects and use them to recover time preference parameters. First, comparing pre-commitment probabilities between Treatment Group 1 and Treatment Group 3 gives us the "early" incentive e¤ect, while comparing Treatment Group 2 to Treatment Group 3 gives us the "delayed" incentive e¤ect. We can then use these to estimate . Similarly, comparing savings probabilities between Treatment Groups 4 and 5 relative to Treatment Group 6 gives us the "immediate" and "delayed" incentive e¤ects.
These are in turn used to estimate . As mentioned above, one challenge will be addressing sample attrition. Our …rst approach is to use all the original study participants and to code those who dropped out of the study as a zero outcome, giving us an "intent-to-treat" (ITT) e¤ect. The ITT e¤ect on pre-commitment is shown in the …rst row of Table 6 . Treatment e¤ects are relative to Treatment Group 3. The early and delayed incentives increase the likelihood of pre-committing by about 9 percentage points, from a baseline of 5 percentage points. The e¤ect is identical across the early and delayed treatment groups, which is consistent with a value of = 1. This result is not sensitive to introducing control variables.
The ITT e¤ect on savings is shown in Table 7 . Treatment e¤ects here are relative to Treatment Group 6. When not controlling for observables, we actually have small negative e¤ect for Treatment Group 4, as compared to a slight positive e¤ect for Treatment Group 6. Our null hypothesis predicts similar, nonnegative e¤ects for these two groups.
However, our estimates are confounding the treatment e¤ects with attrition. Thus, our negative estimate for Group 4 is caused by relatively high attrition in Group 4. Note, that after controlling for observables, the results are now nonnegative and slightly larger for Treatment Group 4. We suspect that the control variables may help account for low attrition in Group 4. Nonetheless, the overall small e¤ect, 0.002 -0.003 relative to a baseline of 0.044 is in part due to the large drop-o¤ in sample size once we condition on tax site appearance. We discuss ways to account for attrition below. Horowitz and Manksi (2000) . One, two and three stars denote statistical signi…cance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively.
Treatment E¤ects Conditional on Participation
The ITT e¤ects above re ‡ect both attrition and take up. If we assume that attrition across treatment groups is not correlated with the outcome variables, then we can potentially estimate treatment e¤ects that are more relevant to our theoretical exercise. The …rst row of Table 8 provides treatment e¤ects on pre-commitment conditional on successfully obtaining consent on the phone. That is, the group of individuals who either said "yes" or "no" to the pre-commitment question. We now observe treatment e¤ects of an order of magnitude larger, roughly a 0.2 -0.3 probability increase relative to a baseline of about 0.4. However, the treatment e¤ect still does not vary much when comparing the early to the delayed incentive. In Table 9 we also see larger treatment e¤ects for savings. The e¤ect for Treatment Group 4 is a 0.48 to 0.57 increase in savings probability relative to a baseline of 0.45. Furthermore, the immediate incentive (Treatment Group 4) is between 2 -3 times as large as the delayed incentive, suggestive of impatience in the context of our theoretical model.
Treatment Bounds
One concern is that attrition is confounding our estimates. When estimating the ITT e¤ect, we impute a zero for pre-commitment and savings outcomes for those that drop from the sample. While this is technically correct, we may alternatively view these outcomes as missing, since the treatment was not implemented for these participants.
Viewed this way, we cannot obtain a point estimate for our treatment e¤ects, but we may nonetheless bound these estimates using a method outlined by Horowitz and Manksi (2000) . Unfortunately, in our current setting, attrition is such that the bounds are only marginally informative. Given a binary response, we know the treatment e¤ects are bounded by [-1,1] . As seen in the bottom rows of Tables 6 and 7 our bounds are not much tighter. We now turn to an alternative method of achieving tighter bounds. Note: Treatment e¤ects for Groups 1 and 2 are relative to Treatment Group 3 and conditional on participating in the initial phone interview. Upper and lower bounds are calculated using methods outlined by Behaghel et al. (2009) . Participation rates are in absolute terms, where "Control" refers to Treatment Group 3. One, two and three stars denote statistical signi…cance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively. Note: Treatment e¤ects for Groups 4 and 5 are relative to Treatment Group 6 and conditional on appearing at the tax site. Upper and lower bounds are calculated using methods outlined by Behaghel et al. (2009) . Participation rates are in absolute terms, where "Control" refers to Treatment Group 6. One, two and three stars denote statistical signi…cance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively.
Di¤erential attrition is potentially a larger concern for our estimates that condition on participation. We can use a method proposed by Behaghel et al. (2009) , which allows us to bound the ITT e¤ect for the subsample that participate when o¤ered the early/immediate or late/delayed incentive. This e¤ect is akin to the treatment on the treated. The method allows for a di¤erential e¤ect of the treatment on participation, but relies on an assumption of monotonicity. That is, these bounds assume that members who receive additional incentives are no less likely to participate than when given the baseline pre-commitment or savings treatment. For our pre-commitment estimates, we show evidence consistent with this assumption at the bottom of Table 8 . Treatment Groups 1 and 2 have a higher participation rate than Treatment Group 3. Using this monotonicity, we bound the conditional treatment e¤ect in Table 8 . As can be seen, the bounds are much tighter than those for the unconditional ITT, and are similar for the early and delayed e¤ects.
We cannot, unfortunately, implement the same bounding for the technique for the savings decisions. This is because the probability of participation is lower for Treatment Groups 4 and 5 as compared to Treatment Group 6. This is shown at the bottom of Table 9 . Therefore, we do not calculate the analogous bounds for these treatment e¤ects. We discuss this issue further below. 
Estimating and
Using the methods outlined above, we can use the four estimated treatment e¤ects to recover time preference parameters. These estimates vary depending on the speci…cation chose. Table 10 summarizes the estimates using the unconditional ITT results from Tables 6 and 7. In Columns (1) and (2) we have estimates of very close to 1, albeit with relatively large con…dence intervals. Column (3) has a sign and magnitude far out of line with our theoretical (6) and (7). One, two and three stars denote statistical signi…cance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively.
predictions. As mentioned above, this is most likely attributable to high rates of attrition in Treatment Group 4. In
Column (4), we have more reasonable estimates after controlling for observable characteristics. In both cases, the estimates of are dramatically imprecise. In the bottom two rows of Table 10 , we see that the bounding method alluded to in Section 5.6 is uninformative, as expected. 32 Below, we explore an alternative method that results in tighter bounds. (8) and (9). One, two and three stars denote statistical signi…cance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively.
In Table 11 we present estimates for and based on the results in Tables 8 and 9 . These results are conditional on participation at either the phone interview or tax site stage. Compared to the unconditional ITT estimates, these estimates are much more stable and precisely estimated. Nonetheless, the small sample size results in wide con…dence intervals. The estimates for are slightly larger than 1. The estimates of are now smaller in magnitude, between 0.25 and 0.34. In both cases, we can rule out a value of = 1 with our 95 percent con…dence interval. By conditioning on participation, we are implicitly assuming that attrition was not di¤erentially a¤ected by treatment group. It is the case that attrition is not statistically di¤erent within commitment arms, as can be seen in Table 5 .
Alternatively, if di¤erential attrition is a valid concern, our results will be biased. However, we can still bound the estimates as discussed in Section 5.6. 33 The bottom two rows of Table 11 present our upper and lower bounds for and . In this case, it is only when we use control variables that we can rule out a value of = 1 with our upper bound.
Discussion
Overall, we …nd evidence that suggests that our study participants are have time-inconsistent preferences. Our preferred point estimates for and over an 8-month horizon are 0:34 and 1:08 respectively. These translate into a one-year discount factor of 0:38, or equivalently, a one-year discount rate of 164%. As compared to prior structural estimates, our discount rate is higher than that implied in the life-cycle model estimated by Laibson et al. (2007) (49%), similar to the rate among low-wage workers estimated by DellaVigna and Paserman (2005) (153%) and lower than the rate among single-women with children estimated by Fang and Silverman (2009) (238%) . One challenge to estimation in our context is sample attrition. In particular, di¤erential savings rates across treatment groups may be attributed to sample selection bias. We attempt to account for this by estimating bounds on our time-preferences, but lose much of our precision in the process. As detailed below, a major re…nement will involve reducing the extent of sample attrition in our full-scale study. In addition, our results suggest that more immediate incentives for savings can have as much as 2 -3 times as much an e¤ect on the likelihood of saving. Finally, we are still in the process of collecting longitudinal survey data that can speak to the e¤ect of the illiquid savings account on consumption smoothing.
Re…nements and Extensions to the Study Design
The pilot study has generated several key insights for the design of our full-scale study. First, we underestimated the level of attrition that would occur. However, we have identi…ed what we believe to be the major factors contributing to this phenomenon. We plan to allocate a much larger window of time, on the order of 1 -2 months, and a greater number of research assistants to reaching participants by phone. In addition, we will primarily focus our phone outreach on members of the commitment group and will rely more heavily on tax site recruitment for members of the non-commitment group. 34 On another note, our treatment e¤ects are signi…cantly higher than expected. This tends to reduce the required sample size for a given level of signi…cance and power. Our projected sample size has reduced from about 3,000 to approximately 1,200 participants. This smaller sampling frame allows us to exclusively operate with our already established non-pro…t collaborator.
Another limitation of our study is that we impose the structural restriction of quasi-linearity. Given feedback from reviewers, we propose two strategies for relaxing this assumption. First, we can attempt to elicit risk preferences within our survey using methods similar to Harrison et al. (2007) . These measures of risk preferences can then be used to impose an isoelastic functional form on our f ( ) function. In an appendix, we describe the extension of our model to a standard dynamic discrete choice framework, which can accommodate the additional structure. 35 Alternatively, we may use the "convex time budget" (Andreoni and Sprenger (2010) ) method of simultaneously eliciting risk and time preferences using the additional information imbedded in agents'continuous savings decision. 36 Along the same lines, we plan to add additional survey questions in order to gauge the level of uncertainty with regard to one's income tax refund. This information may facilitate an analysis of sophistication with regard to time preferences.
Research Partners
The PIs will require participation by a tax preparation organization in order to implement the …eld study. We have identi…ed the major collaborator, The Financial Clinic, based in New York City that is working with us on the pilot and will provide the sample for the …nal study. The Financial Clinic is a nonpro…t …nancial development organization that helps low-income families to achieve …nancial stability by providing legal support and …nancial counseling. This organization is particularly well suited for the study in that they maintain contact with their clientele on a yearround basis. Thus, they are able to accommodate the longitudinal structure of the project. In addition, they have previously o¤ered a savings vehicle to tax preparation clients, the Save NYC account. Importantly, the Save NYC account is not simultaneously o¤ered to our study participants. Prior users of the account may continue to the use the account, but this only applied to 5 people within our pilot sample.
8 Research Output and Broader Impact
In terms of promotion of teaching and training, the PIs plan to include graduate students in economics as research assistants (RA), who will help with the on-the-ground implementation of the project. The budget includes allotments for one RA during the pilot study and two RAs during the full-scale intervention. These graduate students will gain invaluable experience with …eld research in economics.
The project requires collaboration with a non-pro…t organizations, such as The Financial Clinic. The PI's interaction with these groups represents signi…cant enhancement in the infrastructure for research, dissemination of scienti…c understanding and bene…t to society at large. Such organizations can bene…t greatly from the research expertise of the PIs in evaluating and improving upon their policies and …nancial tools for lower-income tax …lers.
Furthermore, researchers in general will bene…t from improved lines of communication between academic and the nonpro…t sector, which will foster future research projects similar to the current one. Finally, the clients of these organizations will bene…t from rigorous evaluation and redesign of the …nancial services provided by these public sector organizations.
The project will also help broaden the participation of underrepresented groups. First, one of the PIs is an African-American, junior faculty member in economics, an underrepresented group within the profession. Second, one of the PIs is a past participant in the American Economics Association's (AEA) Committee on the Status of Minority Groups in the Economics Profession (CSMGEP) Pipeline Mentoring Program, and has presented research and participated as a panelist at CSMGEP's Pipeline Conferences every year for the past 4 years (Jones (2006) , Jones (2009) ). CSMGEP's Pipeline Conference is an event that brings minority economists and students (graduate and undergraduate) together for workshops that cover a number of areas in economics, as well as topics such as conducting research, success in graduate schools, the economics job market, and the experience of minorities in the …eld of economics. The PIs plan to present the results of both the pilot study and full-scale project at future Pipeline Conferences in 2011 and 2012, providing underrepresented graduate students greater exposure to research and methods in the …eld. Finally, the PIs plan to advertise the graduate student RA positions among CSMGEP Pipeline graduate students who may be available in the New York region.
In terms of dissemination, the PIs plan to eventually publish the results in a peer-reviewed academic journal. In addition, the PIs will make use of outlets that will distribute their work beyond academia. As a faculty research fellow of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), a PI can share the results of the research as an NBER working paper, which is distributed to numerous journalists and NBER subscribers. In addition, a version of the results will be written for a non-scienti…c audience as a policy brief at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy
Research (SIEPR). 38 The PIs will also disseminate the results to the broader non-pro…t tax-preparation community in partnership with the Financial Clinic. In fact, one of the PIs participated in the 2011 National Community Tax
Coalition conference in Chicago, presenting preliminary results of the pilot study and also sharing lessons from the researcher/practitioner collaborative process (Jones and Panday (2011) ). In addition, the PIs presented preliminary results at the Financial Literacy Research Consortium Spring Workshop at the University of Wisconsin, Madison to an audience of academics and practitioners. Finally, all the papers from the project will be freely available on the PI's websites.
A Appendix
A.1 Power Calculations
In a standard context, one tests the null hypothesis of no treatment e¤ect. In such a case, we typically estimate a treatment e¤ect from the following linear regression:
where T is a dummy variable indicating (randomly assigned) treatment group membership. In our example T may indicate that a tax …ler was o¤ered a savings match and a indicates whether the individual used the savings account, and X is a vector of baseline characteristics and includes an intercept, which help increase the precision of the estimates but are independent of T . For testing the hypothesis, H 0 : b = 0, it is straightforward to calculate the required sample size for a test at a 5% signi…cance level and 80% power:
where is the share of participants saving, T is the share of participants in the treatment group, R 2 is taken from the regression above, the 2.49 follows from the size and power of the test and d is the minimum detectable e¤ect, or the smallest b that we can rule out. Our case is slightly more complex. First, we are estimating four treatment e¤ects, two in each of two groups:
where a c is the commitment decision for the commitment group and a n is the savings decision for the non-commitment group. The four treatment indicators, T j , j 2 f1; 2; 4; 5g, are the early, late, immediate and delayed treatments, respectively. The commitment group in each regression is the baseline sub-group (i.e. Treatment Groups 3 and 6).
For example, the coe¢ cient b i measures how much more likely an individual with an immediate incentive will save relative to an individual in the non-commitment group that received the baseline savings match. Ultimately, we will be comparing the ratio of the early and late treatments in the commitment context to the ratio of the immediate and delayed treatments in the non-commitment context. We would like to test the following nonlinear hypothesis:
against the alternative hypothesis:
Note that given our model, we can rewrite the statistic 4 as:
A.1
So that our we are testing whether or not = 1. Now we will derive the necessary sample size for this test. Using standard results, we have the variance-covariance matrix for the four reduce form parameters:
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4
Nn 3 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5
where N c and N n are the sample sizes, 
and the 
Where T j is the share of individuals in a particular regression, (A.1) or (A.2), that are in treatment group j. Note, because we have an equal probability of assignment to treatment groups, T j = T = 1=3. Next, we de…ne the Jacobian of the test statistic:
and therefore, by the delta method, we have:
where b = (b 1 ; b 2 ; b 3 ; b 4 ). Furthermore, under the null, we have:
Thus, the variance of the test statistic reduces to:
Where a c is the share of individuals in the commitment group that make pre-commitments and a n is the share of individuals in the non-commitment group that save. Now we can derive an expression for our required sample sizes, at a 5% signi…cance level and 80% power 39 :
As can be seen, we have one degree of freedom, in that we can adjust the relative samples in the commitment and noncommitment groups while maintaining signi…cance and power. This can be useful if one outcome, say commitment, generates more precise coe¢ cients. Or if one type of treatment is more expensive than the other. Our total sample size for the study will be N = N c + N n .
There are many unknowns in this expression. In particular, the terms b 3 9 Here, we have used the fact that at the given signi…cance and power levels, = 2:49 p V ( ).
A.3
A.2 Extensive Form Representation of SaveUp and SaveUpFront Accounts
The examples below correspond to a tax …ler who is deciding whether or not to save $600 of the income tax refund.
A.4
A.5
A.6
A.7
A.3 Treatment Bounding Method
A.3.1 Setup De…ne Z to be treatment assignment, which is binary valued and equal to 1 if the unit is assigned to the treatment group and 0 if the unit is assigned to the control group. (In our case, the control group is the baseline treatment group 3 or 6, and the treatment is one of the early/immediate or late/delayed incentive groups)
De…ne C z , a binary variable, which indicates participation in the study. This is either phone contact status or site appearance for a unit if her treatment is assigned to z. De…ne the observed random variable
De…ne Y z to be the pre-commitment decision or savings decision if the unit's treatment assignment is set to z and de…ne
We assumed that (Y 1 ; Y 0 ; C 1 ; C 0 ) ? Z
The following distributions are identi…ed
Pr (Y; ZjC = 1)
Following Horowitz and Manksi (2000) , we derive bounds on this ITT e¤ect. Note, that for each z:
Since, Y z 2 f0; 1g we can bound this by using the two extreme assumptions:
which in turn imply that:
Taking the lower bound for E (Y 1 ) and the upper bound for E (Y 0 ) to generate a lower bound on 1 and vice versa for an upper bound on 1 , we have 
We can potentially get sharper bounds on a similar treatment e¤ect for a subgroup, namely those who are successfully contacted by phone or appearing at the tax site. Following Behaghel et al. (2009) , we can see that:
To further simplify, use an assumption of monotonicity:
Now, assuming C 1 C 0 and using the fact that Y 0 2 f0; 1g
= Pr (C = 1jZ = 1) Pr (C = 1jZ = 0)
Thus, we have bounds on 2 :
Following Lee (2002), we can also estimate the treatment e¤ect for a smaller subsample:
Again, assuming monotonicity:
It follows that:
Thus, we have that:
Also, we have that:
A.10 where:
The second to last line follows from monotonicity, and the last line follows from independence of (C 1 ; C 0 ) and Z.
Now, we know that C 1 = C 0 = 1 for p of the individuals for whom Z = 1 and C = 1. Therefore, their mean Y 1 is bounded above by the top p of that group and bounded below by the bottom p of that group. Thus, we have the following:
where:
Note, the de…nition of y q is not well de…ned in the case of this discrete function, since G is not a one-to-one function.
In any event, since Y 2 f0; 1g, we know that:
Looking at the upper bound, for example, if the share of those for whom Z = 1 and C = 1 with Y = 1 is larger than p, then Y = 1 for everyone in the top p of that group. Otherwise, everyone with Y = 1 is in the top p of that group.
So, the mean Y of the top p is found by taking the fraction of everyone with a Y = 1 and normalizing it to the top p in the group. Finally, we have the bounds:
A.3.5 Comparing the width of the bounds First, we see that the width of the bounds on 1 is 1;ub 1;lb = Pr (C = 0jZ = 1) + Pr (C = 0jZ = 0)
We can also see from above that the width of the bounds on 2 is:
2;ub 2;lb = Pr (C = 1jZ = 1) Pr (C = 1jZ = 0) Pr (C = 1jZ = 1)
A.11
Comparing the …rst two sets of bounds, we have that The width of the bounds on 3 is:
When comparing the second and third set of bounds, we have four cases. In the …rst case, when
it's clear that: The third line follows from the monotonocity assumption, which implies that p 1. In the last two cases, the relative size of the bound widths is ambiguous. First, when E (Y jZ = 1; C = 1) p 1 E (Y jZ = 1; C = 1), then we have:
) 2;ub 2;lb 3;ub 3;lb
A.12
Second, when 1 E (Y jZ = 1; C = 1) p E (Y jZ = 1; C = 1) we have:
Comparing the …rst and third set of bounds similarly depends on the values of p and E (Y jZ = 1; C = 1).
A.4 Extension of Model to Structural Dynamic Discrete Choice Framework
By imposing additional structural assumptions, we can recast our model in the standard dynamic discrete choice framework with potentially time-inconsistent agents (see Fang and Wang (2008) and Mahajan and Tarozzi (2010) for models along similar lines).
A.4.1 State Spaces, Action Spaces and Payo¤s
Period 1
State Space: x 1 2 X 1 where x 1 are pre-intervention observables that a¤ect the agent's utility in period 1.
Action Space: a 1 2 f0; 1g 40 where a 1 = 1 indicates that the agent chooses the soft "pre-commitment" decision to save in period 2. a 1 = 0 if the agent chooses the soft "pre-commitment" decision to not save in period 2. For simplicity in exposition the model does not consider an alternative third action in which the agent rejects the …rst two actions.
41
Utility in Period 1: The model assumes standard per-period preferences. In particular, it requires that the unobserved component of utility is additively separable from and independent of the observed determinants of utility x 1 . Speci…cally, u(x 1 ; a 1 ; a1 ) = (x 1 ; a 1 ) + a1 . To focus only on essential details it is assumed that (x 1 ; a 1 ) for some constant . ( 0 ; 1 ) are unobserved i.i.d. random variables and 1 0 represents the net bene…t of deciding to pre-commit to save against pre-committing to not saving.
Period 2
State Space: x 2 2 X 2 f0; 1g where x 2 = a 1 just records the …rst period decision. It is straightforward to incorporate additional state variables using standard approaches but those are eliminated here in the interest of brevity.
Utility in Period 2: Payo¤s in the second period vary by treatment group. In the non-commitment group (NC) agents receive a payment of i if they decide to save, representing the "immediate" savings incentive. This is the additional $50 incentive for saving, which is contrasted with an equivalent "delayed" incentive received in period 3. In the commitment group (C), if the agent had chosen to pre-commit to saving a 1 = 1 she receives a payo¤ e (irrespective of her actual savings decision). This is referred to as the "early" incentive for pre-committing, which contrasts with the "late" incentive in period 3. In addition, agents in both groups are assumed to pay a cost c (i.e. the cost of saving c dollars, including a binding borrowing constraint) if they decide to save. As per usual, the model imposes additive separability between the unobserved determinants of choice: u(x 2 ; a 2 ) = u m (x 2 ; a 2 ) + a2 , where m 2 fN C; Cg.
4 0 Note that in the model, we only model actions related to the project choices. In principle, agents could make other decisions (e.g. change their saving and/or consumption behaviour) in response to this news. If for instance, individuals can easily borrow, then they can take other actions that would render the …ndings from our study uninteresting. However, we assume here that individuals face credit constraints (and we attempt to quantify them via the survey). If individuals are credit constrained, then the savings decision at tax-time is an inter-temporal utility trade-o¤ rather than a mere arbitrage opportunity. Individuals can still re-optimize, however, by delaying debt-repayment. We hope to capture this via our survey instruments. 4 1 It can be shown that this third action is weakly dominated.
A.13
The experimental design yields the following values for the u m (x 2 ; a 2 ) for the di¤erent treatment groups. Utility is denoted as a function f of the payo¤s since in future work the model will be expanded to explore what can be learned about f ( ) experimentally. However, for this proposal the model will deal mostly with the case where f is the identity function, i.e. utility is quasi-linear. This is a strong assumption and discussion of relaxing it can be found in our discussion. 42 Payo¤s for period 2 are given by 
Period 3
State Space: x 3 2 X 3 f0; 1g f0; 1g where x 3 = (x 2 ; a 2 ).
Agents take no action in this period and payo¤s are a function of group status and state variables. In the noncommitment group, if the agent had not saved in period 2, then she receives a payo¤ of 0. If she has saved, she receives a savings incentive of d. This payo¤ d is referred to as the "delayed" payo¤. In the commitment group, the agent receives a payo¤ of p if the pre-commitment and actual savings decision coincide, i.e. x 2 = a 2 . That is, if she had pre-committed to not saving and ful…lled that commitment in period 2 or if the agent had pre-committed to saving in period 1 and she followed through with that commitment, she again receives the a payo¤ p. Finally, for members of the commitment group, a payo¤ l is received irrespective of her period 2 saving decision. This is the "late" incentive for pre-committing to save. Finally, agents in either group who chose to save in period 2 receive a payo¤ of b, which is in e¤ect the value of the amount now available to be withdrawn from the savings account.
43 Table A .2: Period 3 Payo¤s by Treatment Group
Discussion: Looking at Tables A.1 and A.2 one can get a general sense of the source of identi…cation. First, looking at the columns for u N C ( ) one will notice that the incentives (i; d) vary depending on the decision in Period 2, a 2 ( x 3 ) and are by construction invariant to the state variable x 2 ( a 1 ) since members of the N C group do not make pre-commitments. Thus, by observing the response of a 2 to experimental variation in (i; d), one learns about Period 2 preferences over utility in Period 2 (i) relative to utility in Period 3 (d). In contrast, one can see in the columns for u C ( ), (e; l) vary depending on the decision in Period 1, a 1 ( x 2 ), but are invariant to Period 2 decisions, a 2 ( x 3 ). Thus, by observing the response of a 1 to experimental variation in (e; l) one learns about Period 1 preferences over utility in Period 2 (e) relative to utility in Period 3 (l). Finally, the comparison of the preferences in Period 1 and Period 2 provide the grounds for testing for time consistency. Note also that in Table   A .2 the commitment reward p depends on both the Period 1 decision and the Period 2 decision. All things equal, pre-committing to save makes saving more likely to occur, and vice versa. In this sense, it is the mechanism by which Period 1 decisions can alter Period 2 decisions, and is necessary for making Period 1 decisions nontrivial (without p l all commitment group agents would choose a 1 = 1).
44
A.4.2 Solving the Model
Period 2
Since the model is a …nite horizon problem, it is solved in a straightforward manner by backward induction. The …rst departure from standard dynamic discrete choice modeling is that the model allows for agents to be potentially present-biased. One can parameterize this time inconsistency using the tractable ( ; ) formulation described in Strotz (1955) . 45 In particular, utility between now and the next period is discounted by a factor of , while utility between any two adjacent periods in the future is discounted only by a factor of . In period 2, an agent in group G will choose to save if where v G (x 2 ; a; ) is the choice a speci…c value function for treatment group G. There is an emphasis on the dependence of this function on the hyperbolic parameter since it will play a key role in the subsequent analysis.
For the following, it will be assumed that the errors ( 0 ; 1 ) are i.i.d. generalized extreme value (GEV). This is done for brevity in exposition, but note that the GEV assumption is not important for the identi…cation results.
In particular the results stated below will continue to hold as long as the errors are independent and have support over the entire real line. Using the GEV assumption, one can relate the observed choice probability P G (a 2 jx 2 ) for treatment group G to the model as P(a 2 = 1jx 2 ) = Logit(v G (x 2 ; 1; ) v G (x 2 ; 0; ))
where Logit(x) = exp(x)
1+exp(x) . Since the di¤erences in choice speci…c value functions will be useful later, the following table records the values here for the basic model. where it is assumed that …rst period (pre-intervention) utility levels u(x 1 ) are identical across treatment groups due to the randomization. Next, one can de…ne the Emax function v C (x 2 ) = Z 1 X a=0 v C (x 2 ; a; 1) + a I v C (x 2 ; a;^ ) + a > v C (x 2 ; a 0 ;^ ) + a 0 ; a 6 = a 0 dF( 0 ; 1 );
where I ( ) is the indicator function. The agent (while in period 1) and for given values of ( 0 ; 1 ) thinks that she will choose to save in period 2 if and only if v C (x 2 ; 1;^ ) + 1 > v C (x 2 ; 0;^ ) + 0 so that in period 1, the agent assumes that her extent of present-bias in period 2 will be^ . For time consistent agents^ = 1. In addition, naive time-inconsistent agents will also set^ = 1 even though when they actually are in period 2 their extent of present-bias will be < 1. Finally, sophisticated time-inconsistent agents realize that their period 2 self is present-biased and set^ = .
Under the assumption that ( 0 ; 1 ) are i.i.d. GEV random variables it is easy to show that v C (x 2 ) = 1 X s=0 P C (ã 2 = sjx 2 ) v C (x 2 ; s; 1) v C (x 2 ; s;^ ) + euler + log and (e; l) have at least two points of support conditional on (b; c) then (and therefore ) as well as^ are identi…ed.
The identi…cation argument is done by contradiction and is available upon request.
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